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I IN THE SUPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAl\IES H. PO\VERS, 
Plaintiff ~ Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 







The parties will be referred to as below. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Utah for disability by reason of a heart 
eondition claimed to have been aggravated while per-
forming the duties of a fireman for Salt Lake City 
Corporation. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
The matter was heard by the Industrial Commi1. 
sion and referred to a Medical Panel. The Medical 
Panel filed its report with the Industrial Commission 
finding that the incident of September 25, 1963, did 110; 
aggravate a pre-existing heart ailment. The Industrial 
Commissoin adopted the report and denied plaintiffs 
claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the order of the In· 
dustrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Com· 
mission on July 23, 1964, for a disability incurred while 
responding to a fire call at No. 4 Fire Station on 
September 25, 1963. ( R. 1). The claim filed by plain· 
tiff stated that the incident happened on April 7, 1964. 
However, this was amended to September 25, 1963. 
( R. 15). Plaintiff alleged that the disability started on 
April 7, 1964. 
Plaintiff testified that he is 33 years of age; that 
he served in the Army from 1954 to 1958; having 
received physical examinations yearly and a thorough 
physical examination when he was discharged. 
2 
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He testified that he was employed by the Salt 
Lake City Fire Department on August 16, 1959, and 
worked continuously from that time until April 7, 
!96~. ( R. 33-36) . Prior to September 25, 1963, he 
had never experienced severe chest pains or complaints 
of that nature. (R. 35). He had always been active 
in sports. ( R. 35). He testified that during the time 
he worked for the Fire Department he was employed 
as a combat fireman; that at the time of the incident 
in question, he was on the swing shift which involved 
filling in at various fire stations for men off duty or 
sick. He would work a 24-hour shift and then be off 
2~ hours. He would work three shifts and then have 
three days off. The usual shift would start at 9 :00 
A.U. The firemen would do their housework, go on 
inspection, have a drill period in the afternoon, and 
respond to any fire calls which they received. ( R-37 -
38). Usually when on duty, plaintiff would go to bed 
at approximately 10:30 P.M. (R. 38). 
On the occasion in question, he had performed a 
routine day and had gone to sleep at approximately 
10:30 P.M. at Fire Station No. 4. They received a 
call at 1 :39 A.M. to 1135 East on First South. Plain-
tiff testified that when the call came in, there was 
anxiety and that when he got out of bed he felt weak. 
He quickly dressed and ran to the tailboard on the fire 
truck. (R. 38-39). He testified that he immediately 
got out of bed and that they had to clear the fire station 
in 10 or 20 seconds; that he rushed to the back of the 
truck; that he felt nervous and excited. As the truck 
3 
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pulled out of the fire station, plaintiff had severe pains 
just above his diaphragm, and extending upward int0 
his shoulder. He described the pain as a burning sen-
sation. About two blocks farther down I Street, when 
the truck was beginning to turn onto South Temple, 
plaintiff put his arm through a leather strap and held 
onto the bar, at which time he slumped and lost con-
sciousness until the truck reached its destination. One 
of his fellow employees informed the captain at that 
time that plaintiff was ill. At the scene of the fire he 
sat down on the tailboard and described the pain as so 
severe that it made him want to retch. He was taken 
back to the fire station in the car of Captain Donaldson 
and spent the balance of the night at the station. He 
did not desire to return home that night in order to 
avoid causing worry to his wife. (R. 40-41). 
Plaintiff described the alarm procedure and how 
the men are awakened; that overhead lights will come 
on about a second before a gong starts ringing. This 
is described as a loud gong. When he responds to a 
fire in this fashion at night he definitely feels excite· 
ment and tension. 
Plaintiff continued to perform his duties as a fire· 
man following the incident of September 25, 1963, until 
March 16, 1964, when he went to see Dr. Null. Plain· 
tiff testified that following September 25, 1963, he 
continued to have the chest pains that he had noticed 
in the early morning of September 25, although the 
pains were not as severe as they were on that night. 
4 
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(R. 42). He testified that he had at least one of these 
chest pains a day, described as a pulling and burning 
sensation, atlhough not as severe as on September 25. 
'Vhile under Dr. Null's care, on April 7, 1964, 
plaintiff passed out and was taken to the St. Mark's 
Hospital. He remained there until April 12, 1964. He 
has been completely disabled since April 7, 1964. (R. 
44). 
Since April 7, 1964, plaintiff has continued to have 
the same pains, although more frequently than before, 
testifying that on some days he will have three of these 
attacks. 
Plaintiff testified that when he first went to work 
for the Fire Department, he was given a physical 
examination, and thereafter received yearly physical 
examinations from the Fire Department, the last one 
being in June or July of 1963. ( R. 46-47) . 
Plaintiff's wife testified that prior to September 
25, 1963, her husband never made any complaints of 
chest pain; that he had no unusual complaints except 
for hemorrhoids; that he was an active man. She testi-
fied that after September 25, 1963, he made complaints 
about chest pain, and there were occasions when she 
noticed plaintiff hunching over, apparently in pain. 
She noticed these complaints almost every day and 
increasing in frequency with the passage of time. (R. 
68-70). 
Dr. Clyde F. Null, a local physician, specializing 
5 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in internal medicine with a subspecialty in cardiovascu-
lar disease, testified that plaintiff came to him for treat. 
ment on March 16, 1964, at which time he gave hirn 
an examination and made a detailed cardiovascular 
evaluation. Dr. Null diagnosed plaintiff as being 
afflicted with an atherosclerotic heart disease, com. 
monly called hardening of the arteries, with an asso· 
ciated severe anginal syndrome, plus an electrocardio-
graphic abnormality designated as Wolf-Parkinson-
White syndrome. ( R. 18). Following the initial visit, 
Dr. Null also established that plaintiff had a high blood 
fat level. (R. 19). Dr. Null stated that plaintiff com· 
plained of pain which began in the chest, primarily 
behind the breastbone, radiating into the neck and 
into the left shoulder and ulnar aspect of the left arm, 
which pain is fairly characteristic of insufficient blood 
supply to the heart muscle itself. Dr. Null testified that 
Mr. Powers, after the first examination, continued to 
have increasing amounts of distress in the form of pain 
and limitation, culminating in the episode of April 7, 
1964, when he collapsed. Dr. Null testified that .Mr. 
Powers is unable to perform ordinary work; he can· 
not climb stairs; and he cannot perform ordinary ac· 
tivity without the development of severe pain. (R. 21). 
The Wolf-Parkinson-White syndrome is unrelated to 
any type of chest pain, this being a congenital con· 
dition which affects the rhythm of the heart beat. This 
is usually a nondisabling condition and is not related 
to the atherosclerotic heart disease. (R. 20-21). Dr. 
Null testified that acute changes in the heart from this 
6 
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particular disease are almost always brought about by 
;cute strenuous exercise, acute emotional upsets, and 
rarely, by overeating. Chronic stress and chronic anxiety 
tend to greatly accentuate the symptoms in this par-
ticular disorder and do indeed aggravate the condition 
and make it worse. ( R. 24) . 
Dr. Null was given a hypothetical question-
assuming the facts of the incident of September 25, 
1963, the lack of complaints prior thereto, and the 
complaints described by plaintiff thereafter, together 
with the examination conducted by Dr. Null and the 
subsequent course of Mr. Powers' condition. Based on 
this hypothetical question, Dr. Null was asked the fol-
lowing question: (R. 26). 
"Now I'll ask you whether you have an opinion 
as to whether or not the incident that I have 
described on September 25, 1963, aggravated 
or precipitated the condition which you later 
found to exist in regard to Mr. Powers' heart 
and arteries?" 
The doctor answered as follows: 
"A. Well, certainly-as we have indicated 
previously-acute stress, strain, emotional ag-
gravation and sudden abrupt exercise, maximum 
effort, these could easily have precipitated an 
occlusion of a coronary artery, or could easily 
have greatly aggravated any underlying or pre-
existing coronary artery difficulty, or athero-
sclerosis. The fact that the man developed pain 
at that time is very strong evidence that he very 
likely did indeed aggravate the underlying heart 
7 
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disease, which must have been present prior to 
the development of his pain. Because of the way 
the disease comes about. I would believe that u;e 
situation that you described did indeed aggra-
vate or precipitate the pain factor that we now 
have, yes." 
Following the hearing of January 18, 1965, in 
which the evidence of plaintiff, plaintiff's wife, and 
Dr. Null, among others, was taken, the Industrial Com-
mission referred the matter to a Medical Panel, with 
Dr. L. E. Viko as the chairman. (R. 74). The Com-
mission directed the Panel in part as follows: 
"The Panel has no jurisdiction to make a 
finding on the occurrence of an accident. There-
fore, in the Panel report just preceding the find-
ings and conclusions, the following language 
should be used; assuming but not deciding that 
applicant had an accident as alleged the Panel 
finds, etc." 
The Medical Panel rendered its first report on 
March 18, 1965. ( R. 86). The Panel concludes with 
the following: (R. 87). 
"In view of the fact that the Panel finds no 
evidence of a myocardial infarction from the 
episode of September, 1963, and even granting 
that an attack of angina pectoris may have been 
precipitated by the occupational events of that 
evening, the Panel finds it hard to accept the 
idea that the occupational events of that evening 
and the attack of that evening were sufficient 
to aggravate pre-existing coronary-artery dis· 
ease to the point of progressive and disabling 
8 
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heart disease. The subsequent events after Sep-
tember, 1963, may reasonably be explained as 
part of the natural course of coronary artery 
disease." 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel states in 
part: (R. 87). 
"It is recognized, of course, that emotional 
or physical strain may precipitate angina pec-
toris in a man with pre-existing arteriosclerotic 
heart disease. The emotional and physical strain 
of response to the fire might have been such a 
precipitating factor for an anginal attack, but 
also other physical and emotional factors in his 
life, such as the worry about the illness and pos-
sible malignant disease in his wife, could equally 
well be such precipitating factors." 
It is interesting to note that the Panel obtained 
its speculation concerning possible worry on the part 
of Mr. Powers concerning illness and possible malig-
1 nant disease in his wife from his testimony at R. 42, 
where he testified concerning pains which he experi-
enced following the incident of September 25, 1963. 
"A. Yes, I did. But I noticed that I started 
having these pains around my heart more often, 
and the pain wasn't near so severe as that night, 
and I couldn't understand why it was. I thought 
I may have pulled a muscle or something across 
my chest, because I played handball and every-
thing all the time. And my wife, at that par-
ticular time_~he was having some female trouble, 
and the doctor didn't know whether it was non-
malignant or malignant or what not, and I was 
9 
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worrying about this. She kept after me to go 
in to see a doctor and get a physical checkup 
but I told her that I just had one in June i 
think, or July, on the Fire Department, and J 
really didn't think there was too much to worn 
about. But I "'.as worried .over her, and having 
the both of us m the hospital at the same time, 
and not knowing what was going to happen, so 
I just put off my examination until she got out 
of the hospital with her operation." · 
Plaintiff filed objections to the Panel report, (R 
91-93), and a further hearing was held by the Indus-
trial Commission. The Medical Panel, in its report, 
admitted that: 
"In view of subsequent events, it is reason-
able to assume that this eposide of September, 
1963, was an angina! attack." 
Dr. Viko admitted at R. 110 of the hearing of 
August 20, 1965: 
"A. If you assume that he had that night an 
extreme degree of excitement, and if you assume 
that he had no other worry at that time, then 
it's entirely reasonable to assume that that situ· 
ation precipitated an attack of angina. And 
again assuming that he had one, which we haven't 
proof of except by a description of the subse· 
quent events." 
Also, he answered the following question: 
"Q. Now in your report did you assume that 
Mr. Powers was telling the truth when he stated 
that he had no attacks or symptoms before the 
night of the fire call on September 25, 1963, and 
10 
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that he thereafter had frequent attacks, especially 
whenever he tried to do any physical exercise, 
up until he went to see Dr. Null in March of 
1964? 
"A. Regarding the first part of the question 
-that he had had no trouble before that night 
-since the Panel had nothing to contradict that, 
we assumed that as a fact. And we did accept 
the statement that he continued to have pain 
thereafter." 
In addition, at this hearing, both Mr. and Mrs. 
Powers testified concerning the so-called worry about 
the illness and possible malignant disease in his wife. 
Mrs. Powers testified that her doctor had diagnosed 
her condition as a small tumor in her uterus and that 
"you don't have to worry about it being malignant." 
That she planned at some time in the future to have 
an opera ti on to have it removed. ( R. 116) . 
Mr. Powers testified as follows at R. 121: 
"Q. My question is were you worried about 
that at the time of this incident at all? 
"A. I was aware of it, but I can't say that I 
worried about it. Because at that particular time 
I was worrying about nothing but going to the 
fire. 
"Q. Did you even have your wife in mind at 
the time you were running to the fire? 
"A. No, I certainly didn't." 
The Panel submitted another report under date 
of October 5, 1965. (R. 125). The Panel stated in part 
as follows: 
11 
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"Under date of March 18, 1965, this Panel 
submitted to you its opinion regarding the abore-
named case. This opinion was to the effect that 
in view of the fact that ]\fr. Powers was not 
examined between the episode of September. 
1963, and March, 1964, the Panel had no certai11 
means of knowing his heart condition after this 
alleged accident. By description, however, an<l 
subsequent events, it appears that Mr. Powers 
had that night at least an angina! attack. The 
Panel cannot exclude the possibility that he ha<l 
a myocardial infarction, but the fact that he <li<l ' 
not consult a doctor for six months makes this 
seem highly improbable to the Panel * * * The 
Panel found it hard to accept the idea that the 
occupational events of that evening and the 
attack of that evening was sufficient to aggra-
vate pre-existing coronary heart disease to the 
point of progressing and disabling heart dis-
ease. The Panel felt that it was more probable 
in view of subsequent events that the progression 
was a natural part of the course of coronary 
artery disease. The Panel felt that the records 
seemed to show that the events of that evening 
entailed no more emotional tension than that 
in many other fires that had been the usual part 
of his occupational duties in the past four years." 
The Panel adopted the original conclusion, and 
plaintiff thereafter filed objections to the second Panel 
report. ( R. 129-130). In lieu of holding another hear-
ing, plaintiff submitted the matter to the Commission 
with a written argument. (R. 132-134). The Commis-
sion rendered its order on February 16, 1966, in which 
it denied the claim of plaintiff. Part of the final para-
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"The heart ailment was not reported for six 
months after the alleged incident. There was no 
unusual exertion or unusual emotional stress 
on the date the alleged accident occurred. In 
our opinion, the incident of April 7, 1964, did 
not aggravate a pre-existing heart ailment; if 
any there w;is, and it surely would not result 
in damage to a normal heart. 
"It is therefore ordered that the claim be de-
nied." 
Plaintiff filed a petition for a rehearing ( R. 139) , 
which was denied by the Industrial Commission on 
March 3, 1966. (R. 140). Plaintiff thereafter filed his 
petition for Writ of Certiorari to appeal the order of 
the Industrial Commission denying his claim. 
POINT I 
THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
WAS CONTRARY TO THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE. 
The Industrial Commission states in the final para-
graph of its order: 
"The heart ailment was not reported for six 
months after the alleged incident. There was no 
unusual exertion or unusual emotional stress 
on the date the alleged accident occurred. In our 
opinion, the incident of April 7, 1964, did not 
aggravate a pre-existing heart ailment; if any 
there was, and it surely would not result in dam-
age to a normal heart." 
13 
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The foregoing language is as much opposed to tli. 
undisputed evidence in the record as the statement that 
the incident occurred on April 7, 1964. The record 
shows that the incident happened on September 25. 
1963, awl plaintiff specifically amended his claim \,, 
so show. ( R. 15). Not only is the foregoing staterne11t 
contrary to the evidence, but it is also contrary to tbt 
law, when it relies on the statement that the incident 
would not result in damage to a normal heart. It j1 
obvious and unnecessary to cite authorities to the effec\ 
that industrial accident claimants need not prove thai 
the accident in question would have injured 11orrn:1I 
parts of the body. The only thing that the claimant 
need show was that he was in fact injured on the job 
and was caused a disability. The foregoing statement 
of the Industrial Commission flies directly in the face 
of the specific language of Section 35-1-60, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, speaking of a disability 
" * * * on account of any accident or injury 
or death, in any way contracted, sustained, ag· 
gravated or incurred by such employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of his em-
ployment," (Italics ours). 
The fore going language by the Industrial Com· 
mission is typical of the manner in which both the 
Medical Panel and the Industrial Commission have dis-
regarded and ignored the undisputed facts of this case. 
In addition,the quoted portion of the order by the In-
dustrial Commission is also fallacious in relying on 
the so-called unusual exertion test which has been 
14 
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abolished in the State of Utah. The case of Purity 
Biscuit Company, et al., v. Industrial Commission, et 
al., ( 1949), 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961, did away with 
1 the unusual strain test in Industrial Commission cases 
in Utah. Since this case, the law in Utah has been 
concerned with the simple proposition as to whether 
or not the exertion, whether it be unusual exertion, or 
ordinary exertion caused the injury in question. How-
em, the Utah Industrial Commission has completely 
ignored this case and the cases fallowing it, when it 
states in its order that it is relying on the fact that 
there was no unusual exertion or unusual emotional 
stress on the date of the alleged accident. The Medical 
- Panel fell into the same error which the Industrial Com-
mission adopted when it stated in its letter of October 
5, 1965, at R. 125: 
"The Panel felt that the records seemed to 
show that the events of that evening entailed no 
more emotional tension than that in many other 
fires that had been the usual part of his occupa-
tional duties in the past four years." 





l i the incident in question, James Powers, being sub-
1 jected to a fire call in the early hours of the morning 
I was subjected to exertion and emotional stress, and that he suffered a severe pain in his chest and shoulders. 
It is undisputed that Powers had not experienced such 
pain prior to September 25, 1963. It is undisputed 
that thereafter, Powers periodically experienced re-
Cltrrences of these chest pains although not as severe, 
15 
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until the time he sought the medical help of Dr. Xi. 
The Chairman of the l\ledical Panel, Dr. Viko, 
H. 100, even agreed as follows: 
"If you assume that he had that night ant 
treme degree of excitement, and if you assl!J]) , 
that he had no other worry at that time, thr'n' 
it's entirely reasonable to assume that that situ[ 1l 
ation precipitated an attack of angina. Am])1 
again assuming that he had one, whi£h we haveniln 
proof of except by a description of the subsf I 
quent events." 
0 
Dr. Viko agreed when questioned as to the histon I 
relied on that the Panel assumed that Powers was tell I 
ing the truth when he stated that he had no attad· ' 
or symptoms before the night of the fire call on Sep 
tember 25, 1963, and that he thereafter had frequell·I 
attacks. In answer to this question at R. Ill Dr. Yik11I 
I 
stated: 
"Regarding the first part of the question-
that he had had no trouble before that night-
since the Panel had nothing to contradict that. 
we assumed that as a fact. And we did accept 
the statement that he continued to have paill 
thereafter." 
It is obvious that if the Panel accepted these un· 
disputed facts as testified to by Mr. Powers and his 
wife, that the following statement by the Panel in it1 
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?\11 "The Panel felt that it was more probable in 
o, view of subsequent events that the progression 
was a natural part of the course of coronary 
artery disease." 
!le.! If the panel felt that the progression of the coro-
SW1J1nary artery disease was a natural progression, then 
:i;:'/ it had to disregard the undisputed evidence of the 
Anijsevere attack which Mr. Powers experienced on the 
renil night of September 25, 1963, the fact that he had 
tbst had no prior attacks, and the fact that he had subse-
quent attacks with increasing frequency. It is sub-
:on mitted that in view of the confusion and the unsup-
:eJJ. ported speculations of the Medical Panel in this case 
.ck· that the clear and convincing evidence of Dr. Null 
ep stands unchallenged and unaffected. 
:
11 il In its original report of March 19, 1965, the 
iku
1 
Uedical Panel even went so far as to speculate that 
: ll'orry about the illness and possible malignant disease 
_: m his wife could equally well have been a precipitating 
- factor along with the emotional and physical strain of 
it the fire call in question. The Panel based this specu-
pt lation on some evidence by Mr. Powers that after the 
Ill incident in question one reason why he did not seek 
medical aid was that his wife was seeing a doctor about 
l· rnme female trouble, and that he was worried about 
ner. However, in the subsequent hearing, Mr. Powers 
s testified that he was not worried at the time of the 
1 1 incident in question about his wife's condition; and his 
l wife testified that the doctor had told her that there was 
r ~tile to worry about concerning the possible malig-
17 
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nancy of the tumor. This illustrates the ends to whicli 
the Medical Panel has gone to defeat Mr. Power~ 
claim. 
Dr. Null in his testimony showed no hesitancy 01 
uncertainty concerning the obvious conclusion of the 
effect of the fire call on Mr. Powers' underlying con· 
dition, when he stated at page R. 26: 
"'Vell, certainly-as we have indicated pre· I 
viously, ac11te stress, strain, emotional aggrava· 
tion and sudden abrupt exercise, maximum ef· 
fort, these could easily have precipitated an 
occlusion of a coronary artery, or could easily 
have greatly aggravated any underlying or pre· 
existing coronary artery difficulty or athero· 
sclerosis. The fact that the man developed pain 1 
at that time is very strong evidence that he very 
likely did indeed aggravate the underlying heart 
disease, which must have been present prior to 
the develop~ent of his pain. Because of the wa)' 
the disease comes about. I would believe that 
the situation you described did indeed aggravate 
or precipitate the pain factor that we now have, 
yes." 
Another factor which seemed to affect the con· ( 
clusion of the Medical Panel was the fact that Powers 
did not seek medical aid for some six months after the l 
incident; however, there is not one iota of evidence dis· s 
puting the fact that Powers had complaints dating o 
from the incident and increasing in frequency until he 
sought medical assistance. As a matter of fact, Dr. 11 
Viko specifically agrees that the Medical Panel accepted 
this as fact. How can the Medical Panel accept this e. 
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fact on one hand and then at the same time state that 
because he did not seek medical assistance for some 
. six months after the incident, they do not believe that 
i the heart condition was aggravated by the incident in 
question? The fallacy of the conclusion of the Medical 
Panel is obvious. 
• The Medical Panel and the Industrial Commission 
'. not only have disregarded the undisputed evidence, 
but they have completely ignored the fundamental 
philosophy and purpose of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Statutes in Utah. The recent case of Baker v. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah, et al., (1965) 17 Utah 
Zd 141, 405 P.2d 613, has reaffirmed the liberal philos-
ophy of the VVorkmen's Compensation Statutes, where 
the court stated: 
"In accordance with the purpose of the In-
dustrial Compensation Act to alleviate hard-
ships upon workers and their families, the facts 
and inferences therefrom constituting a worker's 
right to recover are liberally construed." 
The case at bar clearly demonstrates the injustice 
of giving lip service to such pronouncements by the 
Supreme Court and then ignoring them. The claimant 
in the Baker case was a clerk-typist who felt a sudden 
sharp pain in her left hip and leg as she stooped over 
or raised up. She did not report this incident until the 
• 
1 
Tuesday after the Friday of the incident. The court 
Ill the Baker case held that the Commission could not 
ignore undisputed evidence and reversed the denial of 
' compensation. Certainly had the Medical Panel in the 
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~ase at bar reviewed the Baker cas:, it would have staJ, 
m loud language that the stoopmg over and raisi11 ,, 1 
'1 
up was not an unusual exertion but something th:i 
Aleen Baker did every working day of her life. Tit: 
Industrial Commission has ignored the clear recent prr1 1 
nouncement of the Baker case. 
The case of Jones, et al., v. California Packi1u
1
\ 
Corporation, (1952) 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640, il; 
a case similar in principle to the case at bar. It invoheJI 
I 
death from coronary occlusion occurring after exertiou 
on the job by the husband of claimant. After stating 
the well-settled principle which has been ignored by the 
Industrial Commission in the case at bar that: 
"It is settled beyond question that a pre-exist· 
ing disease or other disturbed condition or defect 
of the body when aggravated or lighted up by an 
industrial accident is compensable under the 
Act, * * * " 
the court proceeds in that case to examine the medical 
evidence in the record. The plaintiffs called two doctors 
who each testified positively that it was their opinion 
that this occlusion and death resulted from the exertion 
and fatigue caused by the work under the circumstances: 
described just prior to J ones's death. The opposing 11 
evidence was given by a doctor who was given the hypo· i 
thetical question and answered as follows: 
"I can't answer the question yes or no because i 
I don't think the medical literature from mv own 1 
opinion or anybody else's opinion can saJ; dog· 1 
20 
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matically this is a definite cause, because the 
medical literature is full of statements that there 
is some relationship between effort and coronary 
thrombosis; and the literature is full of state-
ments to the effect that apparently effort has 
no relationship to coronary thrombosis. * * * 
My own opi,nion is that it possibly is related 
in this particular case, but I don't think you can 
dogmatically say that it is a cause and effect 
or it has no effect." 
The evidence was positive on one side and incon-
clusive on the other, with the result that the Industrial 
Commission was bound, so the Supreme Court held, 
to accept the evidence of the plaintiffs. 
Likewise, in the case at bar, the evidence produced 
on behalf of the plaintiff is clear, direct, and positive. 
The evidence adduced by the Medical Panel, which 
was accepted by the Industrial Commission, is incon-
clusive, speculative, and in derogation of the very facts 
which Dr. Viko stated that the Panel accepted as being 
true. Certainly a conclusion that is not based on evi-
dence and logic is just as inconclusive as the opposing 
testimony in the Jones case, and therefore we cite the 
Jones case as direct and compelling authority in favor 
i of reversing the Industrial Commission in the case at 
'. bar. Not only is the report of the Medical Panel not 
1 in accordance with the evidence and illogical, but it 
is also filled with misconceptions of the law in Utah, 
: such as the necessity to show an unusual strain and 
1
1 
the fact that aggravations of prior existing injuries 
i are not compensable. The Industrial Commission per-
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petuated these errors and adopted these misconceptio111 
of the law. Such an order, in justice, cannot stand. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the order of the Jn. 
dustrial Commission denying plaintiff's claim should be 
reversed and plaintiff's claim granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
Rawlings, 'Vallace, Roberts & Black 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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